This commit is contained in:
Nông Đức Huy
2026-08-13 23:20:22 +07:00
parent 3d6b0e0d4e
commit 5386bc51d1
65 changed files with 4058 additions and 161 deletions
+83
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@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
/**
* Creates or repairs a SUPER_ADMIN account.
*
* pnpm --filter @sport/api run create-admin
* ADMIN_EMAIL=me@example.com ADMIN_PASSWORD='…' pnpm ... run create-admin
*
* This is the production bootstrap path, and the reason the seed never creates
* a privileged account with a known password. Safe to re-run: an existing
* account has its password reset and its role re-granted, which doubles as the
* "locked out of the admin" recovery procedure.
*/
import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
import { SYSTEM_ROLES } from '@sport/types';
import { generatePassword, hashPassword, verifyPassword } from './seed/accounts';
const prisma = new PrismaClient();
async function main(): Promise<void> {
const email = (process.env['ADMIN_EMAIL'] ?? 'admin@sport.local').trim().toLowerCase();
const provided = process.env['ADMIN_PASSWORD'];
const password = provided ?? generatePassword();
if (provided && provided.length < 10) {
throw new Error('ADMIN_PASSWORD must be at least 10 characters.');
}
const passwordHash = await hashPassword(password);
// Verify the hash round-trips before writing it. A malformed hash here would
// create an account nobody can ever sign in to, and the failure would only
// surface at the login screen.
if (!(await verifyPassword(password, passwordHash))) {
throw new Error('Password hash failed self-verification; refusing to write.');
}
const role = await prisma.role.findUnique({ where: { key: SYSTEM_ROLES.SUPER_ADMIN } });
if (!role) {
throw new Error('The super_admin role is missing. Run `pnpm db:seed` first.');
}
const user = await prisma.user.upsert({
where: { email },
update: { passwordHash, status: 'ACTIVE', type: 'SUPER_ADMIN', deletedAt: null },
create: {
email,
passwordHash,
type: 'SUPER_ADMIN',
status: 'ACTIVE',
firstName: 'Super',
lastName: 'Admin',
emailVerifiedAt: new Date(),
},
select: { id: true },
});
await prisma.userRole.upsert({
where: { userId_roleId: { userId: user.id, roleId: role.id } },
update: {},
create: { userId: user.id, roleId: role.id },
});
console.log('\nSuper admin ready.\n');
console.log(` Email: ${email}`);
if (provided) {
console.log(' Password: (from ADMIN_PASSWORD)');
} else {
console.log(` Password: ${password}`);
console.log('\n Generated password — shown once. Store it now.');
}
console.log('');
}
main()
.catch((error: unknown) => {
console.error(error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
process.exitCode = 1;
})
.finally(() => {
void prisma.$disconnect();
});
+14
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@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
import { ALL_PERMISSIONS, PERMISSIONS, SYSTEM_ROLES, type Permission } from '@sport/types';
import { seedDevAccounts } from './seed/accounts';
import { seedCatalog } from './seed/catalog';
const prisma = new PrismaClient();
@@ -144,6 +145,19 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
}
await seedCatalog(prisma);
const accounts = await seedDevAccounts(prisma);
const created = accounts.filter((account) => account.created);
if (created.length > 0) {
console.log('\nDevelopment sign-in accounts (shown once):\n');
for (const account of created) {
console.log(` ${account.email.padEnd(24)} ${account.password} [${account.role}]`);
}
console.log('\n Development only. Use `pnpm db:create-admin` for real environments.\n');
} else {
console.log('Development accounts already exist; passwords left unchanged.');
}
}
main()
+167
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@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
import { randomBytes, scrypt, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
import type { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
import { SYSTEM_ROLES } from '@sport/types';
/**
* Password hashing for scripts.
*
* Deliberately duplicated from `common/security/password.service.ts` rather
* than imported: these scripts run under `tsx` outside the Nest container, and
* booting the DI graph to hash one string would be the more fragile choice.
*
* The hash FORMAT is the contract between the two, and it is self-describing —
* so a drift shows up as a failed login on the very next attempt, not as silent
* corruption. If a third caller ever appears, extract it to a package.
*/
const PARAMS = { N: 16_384, r: 8, p: 1 } as const;
const KEY_LENGTH = 64;
const MAX_MEM = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
export function hashPassword(plaintext: string): Promise<string> {
const salt = randomBytes(16);
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
scrypt(
plaintext.normalize('NFKC'),
salt,
KEY_LENGTH,
{ ...PARAMS, maxmem: MAX_MEM },
(error, derived) => {
if (error) return reject(error);
resolve(
[
'scrypt',
PARAMS.N,
PARAMS.r,
PARAMS.p,
salt.toString('base64'),
derived.toString('base64'),
].join('$'),
);
},
);
});
}
/** Used by the smoke test below to prove the format round-trips. */
export function verifyPassword(plaintext: string, stored: string): Promise<boolean> {
const parts = stored.split('$');
if (parts.length !== 6 || parts[0] !== 'scrypt') return Promise.resolve(false);
const [, n, r, p, salt, hash] = parts;
return new Promise((resolve) => {
scrypt(
plaintext.normalize('NFKC'),
Buffer.from(salt ?? '', 'base64'),
KEY_LENGTH,
{ N: Number(n), r: Number(r), p: Number(p), maxmem: MAX_MEM },
(error, derived) => {
if (error) return resolve(false);
const expected = Buffer.from(hash ?? '', 'base64');
resolve(derived.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(derived, expected));
},
);
});
}
/** A readable, high-entropy password for generated accounts. */
export function generatePassword(): string {
// Base64url of 18 bytes ≈ 24 characters, ~144 bits. Suffixed to guarantee the
// policy's uppercase/lowercase/digit requirements regardless of the draw.
return `${randomBytes(18).toString('base64url')}aA1`;
}
export interface SeededAccount {
email: string;
password: string;
role: string;
created: boolean;
}
/**
* Development sign-in accounts.
*
* Guarded twice — by NODE_ENV and by an explicit opt-out — because a known
* password reaching production is the single worst thing a seed can do. The
* generated password is printed once and never stored anywhere else.
*
* Existing accounts are left completely alone: re-running the seed must not
* reset a password someone has already changed.
*/
export async function seedDevAccounts(prisma: PrismaClient): Promise<SeededAccount[]> {
const accounts: SeededAccount[] = [];
const definitions = [
{
email: 'admin@sport.local',
type: 'SUPER_ADMIN' as const,
firstName: 'Demo',
lastName: 'Admin',
roleKey: SYSTEM_ROLES.SUPER_ADMIN,
},
{
email: 'staff@sport.local',
type: 'STAFF' as const,
firstName: 'Demo',
lastName: 'Staff',
roleKey: SYSTEM_ROLES.CATALOG_MANAGER,
},
{
email: 'customer@sport.local',
type: 'CUSTOMER' as const,
firstName: 'Demo',
lastName: 'Customer',
roleKey: SYSTEM_ROLES.CUSTOMER,
},
];
for (const definition of definitions) {
const existing = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { email: definition.email } });
if (existing) {
accounts.push({
email: definition.email,
password: '(unchanged)',
role: definition.roleKey,
created: false,
});
continue;
}
const password = generatePassword();
const role = await prisma.role.findUnique({ where: { key: definition.roleKey } });
const user = await prisma.user.create({
data: {
email: definition.email,
passwordHash: await hashPassword(password),
type: definition.type,
status: 'ACTIVE',
firstName: definition.firstName,
lastName: definition.lastName,
emailVerifiedAt: new Date(),
...(role ? { roles: { create: { roleId: role.id } } } : {}),
},
select: { id: true },
});
// A customer account needs its shopper profile, or /account has nothing to
// hang addresses and orders off later.
if (definition.type === 'CUSTOMER') {
await prisma.customer.create({ data: { userId: user.id } });
}
accounts.push({
email: definition.email,
password,
role: definition.roleKey,
created: true,
});
}
return accounts;
}