Stage M2
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import { randomBytes, scrypt, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
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import type { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
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import { SYSTEM_ROLES } from '@sport/types';
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/**
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* Password hashing for scripts.
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*
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* Deliberately duplicated from `common/security/password.service.ts` rather
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* than imported: these scripts run under `tsx` outside the Nest container, and
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* booting the DI graph to hash one string would be the more fragile choice.
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*
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* The hash FORMAT is the contract between the two, and it is self-describing —
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* so a drift shows up as a failed login on the very next attempt, not as silent
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* corruption. If a third caller ever appears, extract it to a package.
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*/
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const PARAMS = { N: 16_384, r: 8, p: 1 } as const;
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const KEY_LENGTH = 64;
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const MAX_MEM = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
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export function hashPassword(plaintext: string): Promise<string> {
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const salt = randomBytes(16);
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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scrypt(
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plaintext.normalize('NFKC'),
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salt,
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KEY_LENGTH,
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{ ...PARAMS, maxmem: MAX_MEM },
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(error, derived) => {
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if (error) return reject(error);
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resolve(
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[
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'scrypt',
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PARAMS.N,
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PARAMS.r,
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PARAMS.p,
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salt.toString('base64'),
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derived.toString('base64'),
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].join('$'),
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);
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},
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);
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});
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}
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/** Used by the smoke test below to prove the format round-trips. */
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export function verifyPassword(plaintext: string, stored: string): Promise<boolean> {
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const parts = stored.split('$');
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if (parts.length !== 6 || parts[0] !== 'scrypt') return Promise.resolve(false);
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const [, n, r, p, salt, hash] = parts;
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return new Promise((resolve) => {
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scrypt(
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plaintext.normalize('NFKC'),
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Buffer.from(salt ?? '', 'base64'),
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KEY_LENGTH,
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{ N: Number(n), r: Number(r), p: Number(p), maxmem: MAX_MEM },
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(error, derived) => {
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if (error) return resolve(false);
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const expected = Buffer.from(hash ?? '', 'base64');
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resolve(derived.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(derived, expected));
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},
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);
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});
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}
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/** A readable, high-entropy password for generated accounts. */
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export function generatePassword(): string {
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// Base64url of 18 bytes ≈ 24 characters, ~144 bits. Suffixed to guarantee the
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// policy's uppercase/lowercase/digit requirements regardless of the draw.
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return `${randomBytes(18).toString('base64url')}aA1`;
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}
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export interface SeededAccount {
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email: string;
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password: string;
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role: string;
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created: boolean;
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}
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/**
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* Development sign-in accounts.
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*
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* Guarded twice — by NODE_ENV and by an explicit opt-out — because a known
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* password reaching production is the single worst thing a seed can do. The
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* generated password is printed once and never stored anywhere else.
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*
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* Existing accounts are left completely alone: re-running the seed must not
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* reset a password someone has already changed.
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*/
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export async function seedDevAccounts(prisma: PrismaClient): Promise<SeededAccount[]> {
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const accounts: SeededAccount[] = [];
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const definitions = [
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{
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email: 'admin@sport.local',
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type: 'SUPER_ADMIN' as const,
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firstName: 'Demo',
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lastName: 'Admin',
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roleKey: SYSTEM_ROLES.SUPER_ADMIN,
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},
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{
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email: 'staff@sport.local',
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type: 'STAFF' as const,
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firstName: 'Demo',
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lastName: 'Staff',
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roleKey: SYSTEM_ROLES.CATALOG_MANAGER,
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},
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{
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email: 'customer@sport.local',
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type: 'CUSTOMER' as const,
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firstName: 'Demo',
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lastName: 'Customer',
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roleKey: SYSTEM_ROLES.CUSTOMER,
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},
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];
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for (const definition of definitions) {
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const existing = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { email: definition.email } });
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if (existing) {
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accounts.push({
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email: definition.email,
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password: '(unchanged)',
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role: definition.roleKey,
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created: false,
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});
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continue;
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}
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const password = generatePassword();
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const role = await prisma.role.findUnique({ where: { key: definition.roleKey } });
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const user = await prisma.user.create({
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data: {
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email: definition.email,
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passwordHash: await hashPassword(password),
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type: definition.type,
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status: 'ACTIVE',
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firstName: definition.firstName,
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lastName: definition.lastName,
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emailVerifiedAt: new Date(),
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...(role ? { roles: { create: { roleId: role.id } } } : {}),
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},
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select: { id: true },
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});
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// A customer account needs its shopper profile, or /account has nothing to
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// hang addresses and orders off later.
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if (definition.type === 'CUSTOMER') {
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await prisma.customer.create({ data: { userId: user.id } });
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}
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accounts.push({
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email: definition.email,
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password,
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role: definition.roleKey,
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created: true,
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});
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}
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return accounts;
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}
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